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On	December	 21,	 2017,	 the	 U.S.	 District	 Court	 for	 the	 Central	 District	 of	 California	 released	 its	 long-
awaited	Memorandum	of	Findings	of	Fact	and	Conclusions	of	Law	in	TCL	Communications	v.	Ericsson.2		
In	 a	 lengthy	 and	 carefully	 crafted	 decision,	 Judge	 James	 Selna	 sets	 forth	 some	 important	 new	 points	




establishes	 that,	 for	 non-discrimination	 purposes,	 even	 low	 end	 vendors	 like	 TCL	 will	 be	 considered	







implementation	 of	 the	 2G,	 3G	 and	 4G	 wireless	 telecommunications	 standards	 published	 by	 the	





the	 parties	 began	 to	 negotiate	 a	 license	 under	 Ericsson’s	 3G	 SEPs,	 and	 in	 2013,	 these	 negotiations	
expanded	to	 include	Ericsson’s	4G	SEPs.	Over	the	next	several	years,	the	parties	were	unable	to	reach	
agreement	 on	 the	 terms	 of	 this	 license,	 and	 during	 the	 course	 of	 negotiations,	 Ericsson	 sued	 TCL	 for	
infringement	of	its	SEPs	in	six	non-U.S.	jurisdictions.		In	March	2014,	prior	to	the	expiration	of	TCL’s	2G	
license,	TCL	filed	an	action	in	the	Central	District	of	California	seeking	a	judicial	declaration	that	Ericsson	
















2	TCL	 Communications	 v.	 Ericsson,	Memorandum	of	 Findings	 of	 Fact	 and	Conclusions	 of	 Law	 (C.D.	 Cal.,	 Dec.	 21,	
2017,	SACV	14-341	JVS(DFMx)	and	CV	15-2370	JVS	(DFMx)).	
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100976 
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Ericsson,	prohibiting	 it	 from	pursuing	 further	 infringement	 litigation	against	TCL	until	 the	resolution	of	
the	FRAND	issues.3		The	court	ruled	that	the	nature	of	TCL’s	claims	was	equitable,4	making	it	suitable	for	






Numerous	 U.S.	 cases	 have	made	 clear	 that	 a	 FRAND	 royalty	must	 be	 “premised	 on	 the	 value	 of	 the	
patented	 feature,	 not	 any	 value	 added	 by	 the	 standard’s	 adoption	 of	 the	 patented	 technology	…	 [so	







There	are	 two	general	 schools	of	 thought	 regarding	 the	 calculation	of	 SEP	 royalties	 subject	 to	 FRAND	










3 See	 Jorge	 L.	 Contreras	 &	 Michael	 Eixenberger,	 The	 Anti-Suit	 Injunction:	 A	 Transnational	 Remedy	 for	 Multi-
Jurisdictional	 SEP	 Litigation	 in	 CAMBRIDGE	HANDBOOK	OF	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDIZATION	 LAW:	COMPETITION,	ANTITRUST,	 AND	





Royalties:	 The	Many	 Implications	 of	 Unwired	 Planet	 v.	 Huawei,	 16	 ANTITRUST	 SOURCE	 17	 (Aug.	 2017)	 (discussing	




8 	See,	 e.g.,	 Jorge	 L.	 Contreras,	 Aggregated	 Royalties	 for	 Top-Down	 FRAND	 Determinations:	 Revisiting	 ‘Joint	






11	Apple	 Japan	Godo	Kaisha	 v.	 Samsung	 Electronics	 Co.,	 Ltd.,	 IP	High	Court	 of	 Japan,	 2013	 (Ne)	 10043	 (May	 16,	
2014).	 See	 also	 Contreras,	 Aggregated	 Royalties,	 supra	 note	 8	 	 (discussing	 top-down	 royalty	 calculations	 in	
Unwired	Planet	and	Apple	Japan).	
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into	 account	 a	 reasonable	 aggregate	 rate	 for	 the	 standard,	 assessing	 the	 overall	 added	 value	 of	 the	





He	notes	 that	 the	 “appeal	 of	 a	 top	down	approach	 is	 that	 it	 prevents	 royalty	 stacking”,	which	occurs	
when	individual	SEP	holders	each	demand	a	royalty	that,	when	combined,	can	be	excessive.15			
	
However,	 the	 court	 also	 notes	 that	 top-down	methods	 cannot	 assess	 whether	 the	 licensor	 complied	
with	 the	non-discrimination	prong	of	 the	FRAND	commitment.	 	Accordingly,	 Judge	Selna	undertakes	a	
separate	non-discrimination	analysis	based	principally	on	the	review	of	comparable	licenses	(discussed	





A	 top-down	 royalty	 calculation	 methodology	 has	 two	 steps:	 	 determining	 the	 aggregate	 SEP	 royalty	
applicable	 to	a	 standard,	 then	allocating	an	appropriate	portion	of	 the	 total	 to	 the	asserted	SEPs.	 	As	
noted	above,	the	UK	and	Japanese	courts	that	applied	top-down	methodologies	in	FRAND	cases	based	
their	aggregate	rates	on	public	statements	made	by	SEP	holders	and	other	market	participants.16		Judge	









portion	 must	 be	 allocated	 to	 the	 SEPs	 asserted	 in	 the	 case.	 	 In	 TCL	 v.	 Ericsson,	 this	 determination	




	 Essentiality.	 It	 is	 well	 known	 in	 the	 literature	 that	many	 patents	 declared	 by	 their	 owners	 as	
																																								 																				
12	European	Commission,		Communication	From	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council	and	the	















considering	 total	 royalties	 attributable	 to	 SEPs	 covering	 a	 standard	 must	 also	 consider	 how	 many	
patents	are	actually	essential	to	the	standard.		
	
	 Optional	 Portions.	 	 	 An	 initial	 question	 addressed	 by	 the	 court	 is	 whether	 patents	 covering	
optional	portions	of	a	 standard	should	be	considered	“essential”	 to	 the	standard.	 	After	analyzing	 the	





each	 of	 the	 fifteen	 largest	 patent	 holders.	 Thus,	 of	 7,106	 declared	 patent	 families	 covering	 user	
equipment,	TCL	analyzed	the	essentiality	of	approximately	2,600	patent	families.		After	various	forms	of	
cross-checking,	it	determined	that	a	total	of	413	patent	families	were	essential	to	the	2G	standard,	1,076	
to	3G	and	1,673	 to	4G.22		 Interestingly,	 it	 appears	 that	 TCL’s	 experts	 charged	approximately	 $100	per	
patent	 for	 this	 analysis,23	which	 is	 significantly	 lower	 than	 the	 $10,000	 per	 patent	 that	 is	 generally	
acknowledged	as	 the	cost	of	essentiality	analyses	 for	patent	pools	 (some	figures	are	collected	here).24	
One	of	the	reasons	for	the	low	cost	of	TCL’s	analysis	was	that	TCL’s	experts	reviewed	only	the	claims	of	




	 Ericsson’s	 Share.	 	 To	 compute	 Ericsson’s	 share	 of	 SEPs	 covering	 the	 relevant	 standards	 (the	
numerator),	 the	parties’	experts	determined	which	of	 the	SEPs	already	 identified	would	be	owned	by	
Ericsson	during	the	term	of	a	5-year	(60-month)	license.27		Under	the	holding	of	Brulotte	v.	Thys,28	which	
prohibits	 post-expiration	 patent	 royalties,	 the	 court	 eliminates	 from	 Ericsson’s	 total	 any	 patents	 that	
expired	prior	to	the	date	of	closing	arguments	(May	18,	2017).29	Interestingly,	the	court	did	not	require	
the	 elimination	 of	 expired	 SEPs	 from	 the	 total	 number	 of	 SEPs	 (the	 denominator).	 	 It	 explained	 that	
“[b]ecause	 the	 total	 aggregate	 royalty	 represents	 the	value	of	all	 expired	and	unexpired	 inventions	 in	
the	standard,	…	removing	an	expired	SEP	from	the	denominator	treats	the	invention	as	no	longer	having	
value.	 	 The	 invention	 however	 still	 has	 value,	 that	 value	 has	 merely	 been	 transferred	 to	 the	 public	
domain.	 	 To	 remove	 expired	 patents	 from	 the	 denominator	 (without	 decreasing	 the	 total	 aggregate	
royalty)	would	result	 in	transferring	the	value	from	expired	 inventions	to	the	remaining	patents	 in	the	
standard	instead	of	the	public.”30	
																																								 																				














	 Interestingly,	 while	 the	 parties	 agreed	 that	 Ericsson	 held	 12	 2G	 SEPs,	 they	 disagreed	 with	
respect	to	the	number	of	3G	and	4G	SEPs	SEPs	held	by	Ericsson	(TCL	finding	19.65	3G	SEPs	and	69.88	4G	
SEPs,	 and	 Ericsson	 finding	 24.65	 3G	 SEPs	 and	 111.51	 4G	 SEPs).31		 In	 any	 event,	 even	 using	 Ericsson’s	










of	 the	 U.S.	 	 It	 reasoned	 that	 “a	 global	 patent	 rate	 that	 does	 not	 account	 for	 differences	 in	 national	
patent	 strength	 provides	 the	 SEP	 owner	 a	 royalty	 based	 on	 features	 that	 are	 unpatented	 in	 many	
jurisdictions”.34	For	 the	sake	of	 simplicity,	 the	court	divided	 the	world	 into	 three	 regions:	U.S.,	Europe	
and	Rest	of	World	(ROW)	and	established	precise	discounts	for	non-U.S.	regions	for	each	standard	(e.g.,	
for	ROW,	Ericsson’s	2G	value	share	is	54.9%	of	the	U.S.	value).35	This	approach	is	significantly	more	fine-
grained	 than	 that	 taken	 by	 the	 UK	 court	 in	 Unwired	 Planet,	 which	 divided	 the	 world	 into	 just	 two	
categories:	 Major	 Markets	 (U.S.,	 Japan,	 Korea,	 India	 and	 several	 European	 countries)	 and	 all	 other	
countries,	 including	 China.	 	 The	 FRAND	 rate	 for	 non-Major	Market	 countries	 was	 simply	 50%	 of	 the	
Major	Market	rate.	
	










	 Similarly	 Situated.	 As	 noted	 above,	 a	 FRAND	 license	must	 be	 non-discriminatory.	 	 This	means	
that	the	licensor	must	not	discriminate	against	similarly-situated	licensees.36	In	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	the	court	










36	Id.	 at	 54.	 	 See	 also	 Jorge	 L.	 Contreras	 &	 Anne	 Layne-Farrar,	Non-Discrimination	 and	 FRAND	 Commitments	 in	
CAMBRIDGE	 HANDBOOK	 OF	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDIZATION	 LAW:	 COMPETITION,	 ANTITRUST,	 AND	 PATENTS,	 Ch.	 12	 (Jorge	 L.	
Contreras,	ed.,	2017)	(discussing	non-discrimination	prong	of	FRAND).	
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established	 in	 the	 world	 market”	 [for	 telecommunications	 products].37		 The	 court	 expressly	 excludes	
from	 this	 group	 “local	 kings”	 –	 firms	 that	 sell	most	 of	 their	 products	 in	 a	 single	 country	 (e.g.,	 India’s	
Karbonn	and	China’s	Coolpad).38		The	firms	that	the	court	finds	to	be	similarly	situated	to	TCL	are	Apple,	
Samsung,	Huawei,	 LG,	HTC	and	 ZTE.39	Ericsson	 argued	 that	Apple	 and	 Samsung	are	not	 similar	 to	 TCL	
given	their	greater	market	shares	and	brand	recognition,	but	the	court	rejects	that	argument,	reasoning	
that	“the	prohibition	on	discrimination	would	mean	very	little	if	the	largest,	most	profitable	firms	could	
always	 be	 a	 category	 unto	 themselves	 simply	 because	 they	 were	 the	 largest	 and	 most	 profitable	
firms”.40	
	






	 Competitive	 Harm.	 	 Ericsson	 argued	 that	 in	 order	 for	 an	 instance	 of	 discrimination	 to	 violate	
Ericsson’s	FRAND	commitment,	 it	must	have	the	effect	of	“impairing	the	development	of	standards”.42		
A	similar	systemic	approach	was	taken	in	Unwired	Planet,	in	which	the	UK	court	held	that	a	violation	of	
FRAND	 would	 not	 arise	 unless	 discriminatory	 treatment	 of	 licensees	 would	 “distort	 competition”.43	
Judge	Selna	in	TCL	v.	Ericsson	takes	a	different	view,	holding	instead	that		discrimination	in	violation	of	a	




	 Comparison	 to	 Ericsson’s	 Offers.	 Though	 the	 options	 offered	 by	 Ericsson	 were	 complex	 and	






























Having	 concluded	 that	 Ericsson’s	 offers	 to	 TCL	 were	 not	 FRAND,	 the	 court	 proceeds	 to	 determine	 a	
FRAND	 rate	 for	 TCL’s	 desired	 license.	 It	 does	 so	 using	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 top-down	 rates	 derived	
above,	as	well	as	the	comparable	licenses	reviewed	in	its	non-discrimination	analysis.	 	Below	is	a	table	






	 Royalty	 Base	 and	 SSPPU?	 	 It	 is	 notable	 that	 the	 court’s	 decision	 in	 TCL	 v.	 Ericsson	 does	 not	
discuss	 the	 often	 contentious	 issue	 of	 the	 appropriate	 royalty	 “base”	 for	 TCL’s	 products	 –	 the	 figure	
against	 which	 the	 percentage	 royalty	 is	 applied.	 	 As	 explained	 in	 cases	 such	 as	 Ericsson	 v.	 D-Link,51	
parties	often	disagree	whether	the	SEP	holder’s	royalty	should	be	applied	against	a	component	(e.g.,	a	
chip)	embodying	the	standardized	technology	or	against	an	end	user	product	such	as	a	smart	phone.		If	
the	 percentage	 royalty	 rate	 is	 not	 adjusted,	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 royalty	 base	 could	 result	 in	 radically	
different	payments	to	the	SEP	holder.	This	concern	has	led	to	debates	over	the	appropriateness	of	using	
constructs	 such	 as	 the	 “smallest	 salable	 patent	 practicing	 unit”	 (SSPPU)	 as	 the	 royalty	 base.	 	 I	












On	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 findings,	 the	 court	 prescribes	 that	 the	 parties	 enter	 into	 a	 5-year	 license	




other	 major	 markets,	 it	 also	 establishes	 several	 important	 guideposts	 for	 future	 FRAND	 license	
negotiations.	First,	the	case	establishes	that,	for	non-discrimination	purposes,	even	low	end	vendors	like	
TCL	will	be	considered	“similarly	situated”	to	high	end	vendors	like	Apple,	giving	them	the	benefit	of	the	
rates	 that	 high	 end	 vendors	 negotiate	with	 SEP	 holders	 for	much	more	 expensive	 products.	 	 Equally	
importantly,	it	highlights	the	growing	predominance	of	top-down	royalty	calculation	methodologies	for	
FRAND	licenses.	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
52	TCL	v.	Ericsson,	slip	op.	at	115.	
